Neuroethics
Should DBS personality-change ethics shrink?
Open access · cc by · source: Europe PMC
Personality, identity, agency, authenticity and self (PIAAAS) changes after DBS look rare in first-hand studies, so neuroethics should deflate the bubble without ignoring the remaining philosophical questions.
Key findings
Only 12.5% of first-hand primary studies significantly support a DBS–PIAAAS link, and the eight stronger studies lacked control groups. Pugh treats authenticity as a philosophical concept, not a clinical category, and concludes there is scope to deflate the PIAAAS bubble without bursting it.
Methodology
Pugh reviews Gilbert and colleagues’ evidence-based critique of the DBS–PIAAAS literature and asks what neuroethics should do with it. He distinguishes the causal question (does DBS change PIAAAS?) from the ethical questions that remain even if such changes are uncommon, including reversibility versus ablation.
Limitations
This is a methodological and ethical argument about a literature review, not a new DBS trial. It cannot settle how often personality change occurs in unstudied indications, and it does not offer a full theory of authenticity.
How this study connects
Role on claims
Each row is a claim on a concept or method page where this paper supports, challenges, or qualifies the statement. Roles are hand-checked — not a model guess.
First-hand studies suggest PIAAAS (personality, identity, agency, authenticity, self) changes after DBS are rare, so ethics should deflate the bubble without dropping the remaining questions.
Evidence for the claim as stated.
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