Phenomenology
Is caring responsibility only a choice we take?
Open access · cc by · source: Europe PMC
Care ethics treats responsibility as something taken or refused; a radical phenomenology adds a passive, invisible call that comes from outside the subject.
How this study connects
Role on claims
Each row is a claim on a concept or method page where this paper supports, challenges, or qualifies the statement. Roles are hand-checked — not a model guess.
Care ethics usually treats responsibility as something taken up or refused; radical phenomenology adds a passive, 'invisible' call coming from outside the subject, and the GP study likewise describes an ethical demand refracted through a role rather than chosen principles. Both challenge principle-first accounts but locate the demand differently (in the other person vs. in the profession).
Evidence for the claim as stated.
In care ethics, one phenomenological study used Marion and Levinas to expose a passive, invisible call of responsibility that comes from outside the subject, arguing this complements rather than replaces the social analyses of Tronto and Walker. The result is a re-description of what care ethics already contains, not a new account of caregiver burden.
Evidence for the claim as stated.
Across the set, the output is an argument rather than a dataset. The papers describe themselves as essays, reconstructions or legal-philosophical analyses; none produces a clinical score, a cohort or a trial, and several say so explicitly in their limits.
Evidence for the claim as stated.
Open questions
Tensions this paper is part of
From concept pages' “where studies disagree.” Disagreement means the same question; scope means different assays, populations, or outcomes.
Care ethics usually treats responsibility as something taken up or refused; radical phenomenology adds a passive, 'invisible' call coming from outside the subject, and the GP study likewise describes an ethical demand refracted through a role rather than chosen principles. Both challenge principle-first accounts but locate the demand differently (in the other person vs. in the profession).
Study at a glance
- Design
- Other — Phenomenological extension of care ethics via Marion/Levinas on a passive call of responsibility
- N
- Philosophical ethics; not an empirical sample
- Population
- Care-ethics accounts of responsibility (Gilligan, Noddings, Tronto, Walker) and caregiving burdens
- Outcome
- Passive, invisible call of responsibility beyond taken/refused voluntary responsibility
Structured fields used in claim comparison tables when every cited study has a complete layer.
Inspect source passages
Is caring responsibility only a choice we take?
These passages occur verbatim in the stored paper text. They support the points listed below; they do not verify every statement in the explanation.
Care ethics’ key?
Care ethics emphasizes responsibility as a key element for caring practices (Gilligan ; Noddings ; Tronto , ; Held ; Walker ; Kohlen ; Van Heijst ; Heier ;
If not taken?
If responsibility is not taken or accepted, caring does not occur. Responsibilities to care are however taken by certain groups of people, for else nobody
Key findings
Responsibility has a passive side: a call in silence, invisible, from outside the subject. Making that explicit is a promise for care ethics, not a replacement of Tronto/Walker’s social analysis.
Methodology
Starting from Gilligan, Noddings, Tronto and Walker, the authors note that if responsibility is not taken, care does not occur, yet certain groups still carry it. They turn to Marion (drawing on Levinas) for a silent, invisible call, aiming to ease pressure on individual caregivers by exposing the passive aspect care ethics already has but underplays.
Limitations
This is phenomenological theory, not a new ethnography of carers. It does not measure caregiver burden.
Related papers in this topic
Same topic cluster — not a recommendation engine.