Moral psychology
Do disgusted faces change how we judge moral dilemmas?
Open access · cc by · source: Europe PMC
Briefly seeing disgusted faces changed how acceptable people found sacrificing one person to save others, but whether it made them more or less accepting depended on how easily disgusted they were.
Study at a glance
- Design
- Human experiment — Within-subject blocks of disgust-face vs neutral-face primes before rating 40 moral dilemmas; Experiment 1 used masked subliminal primes (two samples), Experiment 2 used consciously visible primes
- N
- Experiment 1: sample A of 23 and sample B of 28 recruited (three excluded for errors); Experiment 2: 26 participants; disgust sensitivity was measured only in sample B and Experiment 2
- Population
- Singaporean undergraduates at the National University of Singapore
- Outcome
- Rated moral acceptability of the utilitarian action in each dilemma; moderation by Disgust Scale-Revised scores; self-reported emotions
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Key findings
Contrary to the prediction, subliminal disgust primes made people rate utilitarian actions as more acceptable on average (combined samples 2.63 vs 2.46, d = 0.53), and more dilemmas were judged acceptable (56.47% vs 49.80%). With conscious primes there was no average effect. In both experiments, however, people higher in disgust sensitivity shifted more toward acceptance under disgust primes (r = 0.47 and r = 0.43), and when sensitivity was controlled, subliminal and conscious primes did not differ. Self-reported disgust rose equally in both blocks, so the primes did not seem to work by making people feel more disgusted.
Methodology
Before each of 40 trolley-style dilemmas, participants classified the gender of a face; in one block the face was preceded by a disgusted expression and in the other by a neutral one. In Experiment 1 the emotional face flashed for just 16.66 ms between masks so it could not be consciously seen (two independent samples); in Experiment 2 it was shown openly for several seconds. Participants rated how acceptable the harmful but utilitarian action was, and most also completed a disgust sensitivity questionnaire.
Limitations
Samples were small and drawn only from Singaporean undergraduates, and the authors note the pattern needs replication in Western samples. Disgust sensitivity was measured after the task and only in some samples, and the key covariate analysis in Experiment 1 only approached significance. The study cannot identify the mechanism: the authors' idea that disgust faces act through social processing or dehumanisation is speculation. Using faces as primes means results may not generalise to disgusting smells, tastes or scenes used in other studies.
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