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Should palliative care erase all suffering?

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Den Hartogh says end-of-life studies cite Cassell but then measure suffering like a symptom list; dying well can require respecting some suffering, not only removing it.

Source

Suffering and dying well: on the proper aim of palliative care

Hartogh GD · Medicine, health care, and philosophy · 2017

doi.org/10.1007/s11019-017-9764-3Read the full paper ↗36 citationscc by

What they did

He samples empirical papers on suffering at the end of life, all of which cite Cassell’s definition, then shows they pay lip service: they add psychological and social items but still treat them as removable symptoms. Fatigue is his example of why ‘importance’ ratings misfire.

What they found

Physical symptoms of terminal illness often should be soothed because they no longer help. But not every element of suffering is like a distressing symptom it is always in the patient’s interest to eliminate. Within constraints of realism, support should help find an appropriate attitude. Paradoxically, some suffering should be respected as part of dying well.

The limits

What it doesn't show

This is a philosophical reading of a literature sample, not a new hospice trial. It does not say clinicians should withhold analgesia. ‘Dying well’ is a normative claim, not an outcome measure.

Key terms

Cassell’s suffering
Suffering as more than pain: a threat to the person, with psychological, existential and social dimensions.
Lip service
Citing Cassell while still treating suffering as a list of removable symptoms.
Dying well
An appropriate, realistic attitude toward dying, not a zero-symptom score.
Constraints of realism
Support and consolation should not sell an attitude that denies the situation.

Flashcards

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Research intelligence for this paper

See its role on concept claims, tensions it is part of, placement history, and related discoveries.

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Quiz yourself

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Empirical papers often?

Common questions

Do the empirical papers follow Cassell fully?

They accept that suffering is more than pain, but otherwise often only pay lip service.

Should all suffering be removed?

Soothe pointless physical symptoms; do not treat every element on that model.

What is the paradoxical claim?

Some suffering should be respected as an integral part of dying well.

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