Do beliefs about worrying come before anxiety, or after?
Unhelpful beliefs about one's own thinking predicted later anxiety a month on, and anxiety also predicted later beliefs, but neither was linked over time with depression in this low-symptom sample.
Source
What Comes First Metacognition or Negative Emotion? A Test of Temporal Precedence
Study at a glance
- Design
- Cohort — Three online questionnaire waves at day 0, 30 and 60; cross-lagged panel structural equation model with metacognitive beliefs as a latent variable and anxiety and depression as observed variables.
- N
- N=265 · Participants who completed all three waves, pooled from two samples of 150 and 115 people.
- Population
- Mostly female, mostly student adults aged 18-74 recruited at the University of Manchester and via crowdsourcing
- Outcome
- Metacognitive beliefs (MCQ-30) and anxiety and depression symptoms (HADS) across three time points
Structured fields used in claim comparison tables when every cited study has a complete layer.
What they did
The researchers followed two pooled samples of adults (150 and 115 people), mostly female university students, who completed questionnaires three times: at the start, after 30 days and after 60 days. Each time, participants reported metacognitive beliefs, such as that worry is uncontrollable or useful, and symptoms of anxiety and depression. A cross-lagged panel model tested whether beliefs at one time predicted symptoms at the next, and vice versa, while controlling for each variable's stability and for links measured at the same time.
What they found
All three measures were highly stable over time. Metacognitive beliefs at the first time point predicted anxiety 30 days later with a small effect (beta of 0.19), although beliefs at day 30 did not predict anxiety at day 60. Anxiety at day 30 in turn predicted metacognitive beliefs at day 60 with a similar small effect, suggesting a two-way relationship. There were no cross-lagged links between metacognitive beliefs and depression in either direction, and beliefs about uncontrollability and danger and need for control contributed most to the metacognition factor.
The limits
What it doesn't show
This is correlational panel data, so it shows temporal order, not causation; an unmeasured third factor could drive both beliefs and anxiety, and the authors say an experimental manipulation would be a stronger test. The sample was mainly female undergraduates with symptoms mostly below clinical cut-offs, so results may not apply to men, older adults or clinical patients. Low and stable depression scores make the null depression result hard to interpret, and a 30-day lag may not suit how depression develops. The metacognition-to-anxiety path appeared at only one of the two time lags.
Key terms
- Metacognitive beliefs
- Beliefs about one's own thinking, such as 'worrying helps me cope' or 'once I start worrying I can't stop'.
- S-REF model
- The Self-Regulatory Executive Function model, which proposes that metacognitive beliefs drive a style of repetitive negative thinking that prolongs emotional distress.
- Cognitive attentional syndrome (CAS)
- A pattern of worry, rumination, threat monitoring and unhelpful coping that the S-REF model says maintains anxiety and depression.
- Cross-lagged panel model
- A longitudinal analysis that tests whether variable A at one time predicts variable B later, and vice versa, while controlling for each variable's own stability.
- Temporal precedence
- The requirement that a proposed cause occurs before its effect; necessary but not sufficient evidence for causation.
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Quiz yourself
What did metacognitive beliefs at the first time point predict?
Common questions
Does this prove metacognitive beliefs cause anxiety?
No. It shows beliefs predicted later anxiety after controlling earlier anxiety, which fits a causal story, but third variables could explain it and only an experiment could establish causation.
Why was there no link with depression?
The sample had low, stable depression scores with little variation, which makes relationships hard to detect; the questionnaire may also be less suited to depression-related metacognitions.
What would this mean for therapy?
If replicated in clinical samples, changing specific beliefs about worry, as metacognitive therapy aims to do, might help prevent anxiety.
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