Skip to content
PaperFren

Moral psychology

Problems Measuring Utilitarian and Deontological Moral Thinking

Kunnari A, Sundvall JRI, Laakasuo M · Frontiers in psychology · 2020

Open access · cc by · source: Europe PMC

A popular method for measuring individual differences in moral decision-making relies on mathematically flawed formulas and produces highly unreliable scores.

How this study connects

Role on claims

Each row is a claim on a concept or method page where this paper supports, challenges, or qualifies the statement. Roles are hand-checked — not a model guess.

  • SupportsDeontologyconcept

    The moral Process Dissociation Procedure (PDP), designed to isolate individual differences in deontological and utilitarian inclinations, suffers from mathematical flaws and exhibits critically low reliability for the deontological parameter.

    Evidence for the claim as stated.

  • SupportsUtilitarianismconcept

    The Process Dissociation Procedure (PDP), which is widely used to measure individual differences in utilitarian and deontological reasoning, is highly unreliable at the individual level due to mathematically flawed formulas.

    Evidence for the claim as stated.

  • SupportsUtilitarianismconcept

    The reliance on hypothetical, written scenarios across moral psychology research limits our ability to confidently generalize these findings to real-life, high-stakes moral crises.

    Evidence for the claim as stated.

Study at a glance

Design
Other — Simulation of PDP formulas plus an online empirical PDP/high-conflict dilemma battery; reliability of U and D parameters
N
N=1010 · 1,043 Prolific recruits minus 33 failed attention checks; plus 10,000 simulated responders per simulation
Population
Prolific Academic adults completing moral PDP dilemma pairs
Outcome
Internal reliability of process-dissociation utilitarianism and deontology scores (about 0.30 and 0.33) and their correlation with a high-conflict dilemma battery (0.51)

Structured fields used in claim comparison tables when every cited study has a complete layer.

Inspect source passages

Problems Measuring Utilitarian and Deontological Moral Thinking

These passages occur verbatim in the stored paper text. They support the points listed below; they do not verify every statement in the explanation.

10,000 simulated responders in Simulation 1

We simulated 10,000 responders with completely random response patterns with R (version 3.6.3) for the simulation.

10,000 simulated responders in Simulation 2

Again, we simulated 10,000 responders with 20 binary values representing 10 C and 10 IC dilemmas.
Read passages in the original paper

Key findings

The simulations revealed that the mathematical formulas of the PDP generate strong, expected correlations with traditional moral scores even when using completely random data. In the empirical data, participants accepted harm 56.8% of the time in incongruent dilemmas and 23.9% of the time in congruent dilemmas. However, the reliability estimates for the calculated moral parameters were critically low, averaging just 0.30 for utilitarianism and 0.33 for deontology. Furthermore, the correlation between the PDP's traditional score and the alternative high-conflict moral dilemma battery was only 0.51, suggesting they do not reliably measure the same concept.

Methodology

The researchers evaluated the moral Process Dissociation Procedure (PDP) using both simulations and empirical data. They ran simulations with 10,000 simulated responders each to check if the mathematical formulas themselves create artificial patterns. Additionally, they collected online survey data from 1,043 participants, excluding 33 for failing attention checks, to analyze actual response consistency. Participants completed 9 moral PDP dilemma pairs (containing both congruent and incongruent moral dilemmas) and 12 high-conflict moral dilemmas from an alternative battery.

Limitations

This study does not show that process dissociation is entirely useless for group-level experimental research, as aggregate data can cancel out individual errors. It also does not prove that the dual-process model of moral psychology is wrong, but only that this specific tool fails to measure its components at the individual level. Lastly, because the empirical data was collected through online self-reports, it does not demonstrate how participants would behave in real-world, high-stakes moral dilemmas.

Related papers in this topic

Same topic cluster — not a recommendation engine.