Informed consent
Should we nudge people into screening?
Open access · cc by · source: Europe PMC
The help-bad-choosers argument says nudges fix deficient choosers; epistemic risk in screening (being wrong in knowledge-making, including false positives) undercuts that defence and even opt-out’s autonomy.
How this study connects
Role on claims
Each row is a claim on a concept or method page where this paper supports, challenges, or qualifies the statement. Roles are hand-checked — not a model guess.
Nudging toward a test is not harmless help when the test can be wrong.
The 'help bad choosers' defence of nudging people into screening is undercut by epistemic risk, including false positives, which even challenges the automaticity of opt-out designs.
Evidence for the claim as stated.
The paediatricians' study argues that preventing harm to the child can justify physician-led decisions, whereas the nudging paper warns against steering choices toward what experts think best. They concern different decision-makers (parents of a child vs. adults choosing screening), so this is a difference in scope, but both ask when guidance becomes manipulation.
Evidence for the claim as stated.
Open questions
Tensions this paper is part of
From concept pages' “where studies disagree.” Disagreement means the same question; scope means different assays, populations, or outcomes.
The paediatricians' study argues that preventing harm to the child can justify physician-led decisions, whereas the nudging paper warns against steering choices toward what experts think best. They concern different decision-makers (parents of a child vs. adults choosing screening), so this is a difference in scope, but both ask when guidance becomes manipulation.
History
When this study was placed
Dated entries from the concept change log — when this paper was added or removed as support, challenge, or qualifier on a claim.
Placed as supporting evidence on Informed consent
The paediatricians' study argues that preventing harm to the child can justify physician-led decisions, whereas the nudging paper warns against steering choices toward what experts think best. They concern different decision-makers (parents of a child vs. adults choosing screening), so this is a difference in scope, but both ask when guidance becomes manipulation.
Inspect source passages
Should we nudge people into screening?
These passages occur verbatim in the stored paper text. They support the points listed below; they do not verify every statement in the explanation.
Uptake goal?
increase screening participation rates among the target population. One strategy that has become particularly prominent in recent years is the use of nudgi
Nudge def?
Nudging involves “deliberate changes to and designs of people’s choice environments—the ways in which options are presented or framed—in attempts to predic
Key findings
HBCA looks like a strong reason to nudge despite autonomy/consent worries, but epistemic risk makes it doubtful that opting out is fully autonomous and that nudges simply help bad choosers toward their own good.
Methodology
The author defines nudging as designing choice environments to raise screening uptake, states the HBCA, then introduces epistemic risk as the risk of being wrong in knowledge-producing practices. Value judgments about which errors to tolerate fall on physicians and decision-makers.
Limitations
This is a principle paper about screening programmes, not a trial of a specific nudge. It does not quantify false-positive rates itself.
Related papers in this topic
Same topic cluster — not a recommendation engine.