Informed consent
Should we nudge people into screening?
Open access · cc by · source: Europe PMC
The help-bad-choosers argument says nudges fix deficient choosers; epistemic risk in screening (being wrong in knowledge-making, including false positives) undercuts that defence and even opt-out’s autonomy.
Key findings
HBCA looks like a strong reason to nudge despite autonomy/consent worries, but epistemic risk makes it doubtful that opting out is fully autonomous and that nudges simply help bad choosers toward their own good.
Methodology
The author defines nudging as designing choice environments to raise screening uptake, states the HBCA, then introduces epistemic risk as the risk of being wrong in knowledge-producing practices. Value judgments about which errors to tolerate fall on physicians and decision-makers.
Limitations
This is a principle paper about screening programmes, not a trial of a specific nudge. It does not quantify false-positive rates itself.
How this study connects
Role on claims
Each row is a claim on a concept or method page where this paper supports, challenges, or qualifies the statement. Roles are hand-checked — not a model guess.
The help-bad-choosers defence of screening nudges is undercut by epistemic risk, including false positives, which even challenges opt-out’s automaticity.
Evidence for the claim as stated.
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Same topic cluster — not a recommendation engine.