Embodied mind
Predictive processing from cognitivism to autopoiesis
Open access · cc by · source: Europe PMC
Active inference under the free-energy principle is enactive and embodied, unlike modular comparator models.
Key findings
Comparator models remain modular cognitivism; radical predictive processing is connectionist; the FEP treats nested Markov blankets as constitutive coupling of brain, body, and niche rather than a sceptical wall hiding the world.
Methodology
They sort predictive-processing theories by commitment to embodiment and argue that Active Inference, as entailed by the Free Energy Principle, is not a cognitivist comparator scheme but an autopoietic, empirically usable synthesis of internalist and externalist views.
Limitations
It does not identify which neural systems encode domain-specific uncertainty, nor settle whether distributed 'representations' still count as representations.
How this study connects
Role on claims
Each row is a claim on a concept or method page where this paper supports, challenges, or qualifies the statement. Roles are hand-checked — not a model guess.
Active inference under the free-energy principle is read as enactive and embodied, unlike modular comparator models.
Evidence for the claim as stated.
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