Embodied mind
Predictive processing from cognitivism to autopoiesis
Open access · cc by · source: Europe PMC
Active inference under the free-energy principle is enactive and embodied, unlike modular comparator models.
How this study connects
Role on claims
Each row is a claim on a concept or method page where this paper supports, challenges, or qualifies the statement. Roles are hand-checked — not a model guess.
Even formal brain theories can be read as embodied rather than cognitivist.
Active inference under the free-energy principle is read as enactive and embodied, unlike modular comparator models of cognition.
Evidence for the claim as stated.
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Predictive processing from cognitivism to autopoiesis
These passages occur verbatim in the stored paper text. They support the points listed below; they do not verify every statement in the explanation.
Are comparator models embodied?
Philosophically speaking, comparator-based models are unambiguously cognitivist: information processing proceeds within the confines of the brain by
What do Allen and Friston claim about Active Inference?
Active Inference, as entailed by the Free Energy Principle (FEP), is not only fundamentally enactive and embodied, but further offers a synthetic,
Key findings
Comparator models remain modular cognitivism; radical predictive processing is connectionist; the FEP treats nested Markov blankets as constitutive coupling of brain, body, and niche rather than a sceptical wall hiding the world.
Methodology
They sort predictive-processing theories by commitment to embodiment and argue that Active Inference, as entailed by the Free Energy Principle, is not a cognitivist comparator scheme but an autopoietic, empirically usable synthesis of internalist and externalist views.
Limitations
It does not identify which neural systems encode domain-specific uncertainty, nor settle whether distributed 'representations' still count as representations.
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