Embodied mind
Nested Markov blankets beyond internalism
Open access · cc by · source: Europe PMC
Cognitive boundaries are multiple nested Markov blankets; brain, body, and world are not uniquely privileged.
How this study connects
Role on claims
Each row is a claim on a concept or method page where this paper supports, challenges, or qualifies the statement. Roles are hand-checked — not a model guess.
Where the mind 'ends' depends on the scale you look at.
Cognitive boundaries are argued to be multiple nested Markov blankets, so brain, body and world are not uniquely privileged; and non-lawful regularities in a form of life can support skilled engagement with distant socio-cultural affordances.
Evidence for the claim as stated.
The body-awareness paper is a phenomenological take on therapies; the Markov-blanket paper is a formal multi-scale claim — they share anti-internalism without sharing a method.
Evidence for the claim as stated.
Open questions
Tensions this paper is part of
From concept pages' “where studies disagree.” Disagreement means the same question; scope means different assays, populations, or outcomes.
The body-awareness paper is a phenomenological take on therapies; the Markov-blanket paper is a formal multi-scale claim — they share anti-internalism without sharing a method.
- Supports · What do mind-body therapies share?
History
When this study was placed
Dated entries from the concept change log — when this paper was added or removed as support, challenge, or qualifier on a claim.
Placed as supporting evidence on Embodied mind
Cognitive boundaries are argued to be multiple nested Markov blankets, so brain, body and world are not uniquely privileged; and non-lawful regularities in a form of life can support skilled engagement with distant socio-cultural affordances.
Study at a glance
- Design
- Other — Free-energy/Markov-blanket argument for nested cognitive boundaries beyond internalism/externalism
- N
- Theoretical cognitive science/philosophy; not an empirical sample
- Population
- Debates on cognitive boundaries (brain, body, world) in embodied/extended cognition
- Outcome
- Multiple nested Markov blankets rather than a uniquely privileged cognitive boundary
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Inspect source passages
Nested Markov blankets beyond internalism
These passages occur verbatim in the stored paper text. They support the points listed below; they do not verify every statement in the explanation.
Varela and colleagues articulated radical enactive/embodied/extended cognition in 1991.
Over two decades ago, in 1991, Francisco Varela and colleagues articulated a general idea that now underlies what might be called radical views on cognition ; namely, enactive, embodied, and extended approaches to cognition.
What is their thesis about cognitive boundaries?
This is the idea that the boundaries of cognitive systems are nested and multiple — and that, with respect to its study, cognition has no fixed or
Key findings
A living system is a hierarchy of blankets; which boundary matters depends on the phenomenon and explanatory interests, which implies both ontological and methodological pluralism coordinated by the FEP.
Methodology
They use the variational free-energy principle and Markov-blanket formalism to reject unique, essential cognitive boundaries and the Equal Partner Principle, defending a multiscale integrationist alternative to internalism versus externalism.
Limitations
The FEP is not a theory of everything: it does not by itself explain the processes that constitute living systems, and it does not make every contributing factor equally important.
Related papers in this topic
Same topic cluster — not a recommendation engine.