Embodied mind
Does a person with advanced dementia remain the same person?
Open access · cc by · source: Europe PMC
Keeping a brain able to support consciousness is not enough for someone to stay the same person; they must also keep their deeper character, values and relationships.
Study at a glance
- Design
- Other — Philosophical argument using conceptual distinctions, objections and a hypothetical case (the re-emergent patient) to revise a theory of personal identity
- N
- No participants or data; a theoretical argument
- Population
- Persons with progressive dementia and hypothetical future treatments that regenerate brain tissue
- Outcome
- Thesis: identity over time requires brain continuity sufficient for consciousness plus retention of higher-order personality, values and relationships
Structured fields used in claim comparison tables when every cited study has a complete layer.
Key findings
Narrative views fail because a self-told story presupposes a numerically identical teller, and many dementia patients cannot tell a coherent story. Psychological continuity views imply identity may flicker day to day and that it does not matter, which fits poorly with caregivers' experience; brain identity views are too permissive, counting someone as surviving without any capacity for consciousness. McMahan's account faces the Identity-Concern Objection and implies the re-emerged patient is the same person. The author proposes a Revised Embodied Mind Account requiring both minimal brain continuity for consciousness and retention of higher-order personality, values and relationships.
Methodology
The author reviews the distinction between numerical identity (being the same individual) and qualitative identity (what someone is like), and tests narrative, psychological continuity, brain identity and Embodied Mind theories against dementia. He raises objections to McMahan's Embodied Mind Account, including a thought experiment about a patient whose brain is regenerated after late-stage Alzheimer's but whose memories, values and relationships are gone.
Limitations
The revised account is offered tentatively and leaves vague which traits count as higher-order and how much must be retained. It rests on intuitions about a science-fiction case, and the author admits empirical evidence on how people judge identity in dementia is inconclusive and varied. Including relationships in identity is acknowledged as controversial, since it seems to make identity depend partly on other people. The paper does not work out what the account implies for practical issues like advance directives.
How this study connects
Role on claims
Each row is a claim on a concept or method page where this paper supports, challenges, or qualifies the statement. Roles are hand-checked — not a model guess.
Some embodied accounts still require more than bodily continuity for the same person to survive.
A rival analysis argues narrative views fail in dementia (a story presupposes a teller), psychological-continuity views imply identity can flicker day to day, and brain-identity views are too permissive; it proposes a Revised Embodied Mind Account requiring both minimal brain continuity for consciousness and retention of higher-order personality, values and relationships.
Evidence for the claim as stated.
Some embodied accounts still require more than bodily continuity for the same person to survive.
A rival analysis argues narrative views fail in dementia (a story presupposes a teller), psychological-continuity views imply identity can flicker day to day, and brain-identity views are too permissive; it proposes a Revised Embodied Mind Account requiring both minimal brain continuity for consciousness and retention of higher-order personality, values and relationships.
Scope note — Offered tentatively; relies on a science-fiction thought experiment and leaves 'higher-order' traits vague.
Limits the claim's scope: a different population, assay, or outcome.
Both dementia papers are embodied accounts, but they disagree on what survives: one locates the self in bodily selfhood and implicit memory, so the person persists despite lost reflection; the other requires retained higher-order personality, values and relationships, so severe loss can end the same person.
Same question, contrary or null result.
Open questions
Tensions this paper is part of
From concept pages' “where studies disagree.” Disagreement means the same question; scope means different assays, populations, or outcomes.
Both dementia papers are embodied accounts, but they disagree on what survives: one locates the self in bodily selfhood and implicit memory, so the person persists despite lost reflection; the other requires retained higher-order personality, values and relationships, so severe loss can end the same person.
- Supports · Is the self lost in dementia?
History
When this study was placed
Dated entries from the concept change log — when this paper was added or removed as support, challenge, or qualifier on a claim.
Placed as supporting evidence on Embodied mind
A rival analysis argues narrative views fail in dementia (a story presupposes a teller), psychological-continuity views imply identity can flicker day to day, and brain-identity views are too permissive; it proposes a Revised Embodied Mind Account requiring both minimal brain continuity for consciousness and retention of higher-order personality, values and relationships.
Placed as a scope qualifier on Embodied mind
A rival analysis argues narrative views fail in dementia (a story presupposes a teller), psychological-continuity views imply identity can flicker day to day, and brain-identity views are too permissive; it proposes a Revised Embodied Mind Account requiring both minimal brain continuity for consciousness and retention of higher-order personality, values and relationships.
Placed as a challenge on Embodied mind
Both dementia papers are embodied accounts, but they disagree on what survives: one locates the self in bodily selfhood and implicit memory, so the person persists despite lost reflection; the other requires retained higher-order personality, values and relationships, so severe loss can end the same person.
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Same topic cluster — not a recommendation engine.