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Philosophy of science

Pluralism, relativism, and van Fraassian stances

Veigl SJ · Synthese · 2021

Open access · cc by · source: Europe PMC

Scientific pluralism does not entail epistemic relativism; the usual 'renunciation of judgment' contrast fails.

Study at a glance

Design
Other — Epistemology arguing scientific pluralism does not entail epistemic relativism
N
Philosophy of science; not an empirical sample
Population
Scientific pluralism and epistemic relativism as stances in philosophy of science
Outcome
Failed one-dimensional entailment and flawed ‘renunciation of judgment’ contrasts

Structured fields used in claim comparison tables when every cited study has a complete layer.

Key findings

Relativists do not renounce judgment (it stays inside an epistemic system); values push relativism to the choice of values; some SP and ER versions can combine, but there is no one-dimensional entailment from SP to ER.

Methodology

They dismantle two standard pluralist demarcations from epistemic relativism (renunciation of judgment; epistemic values), then treat scientific pluralism and epistemic relativism as van Fraassian stances whose friction is over VEPPs and levels of analysis.

Limitations

It is a 'hammer and chisel' overview: it does not etch every author's VEPP package, nor prove which stance-pairings must always hold.

How this study connects

Role on claims

Each row is a claim on a concept or method page where this paper supports, challenges, or qualifies the statement. Roles are hand-checked — not a model guess.

  • SupportsPhilosophy of scienceconcept

    Scientific pluralism is argued not to entail epistemic relativism or a simple ‘renunciation of judgment’.

    Evidence for the claim as stated.

  • SupportsCase Study Methodmethod

    When the target is the relationship between philosophical positions rather than a scientific practice, authors may trade the case for a broad map. The pluralism paper describes itself as a 'hammer and chisel' overview that treats scientific pluralism and epistemic relativism as stances, and explicitly does not etch every author's package of values or prove which stance pairings must hold.

    Evidence for the claim as stated.

  • SupportsCase Study Methodmethod

    Depth against breadth. The reductionism and anorexia papers each reconstruct one case in detail and draw conclusions bounded by it; the pluralism paper deliberately surveys many positions at once and accepts that it cannot detail each author's commitments. The first approach can say more about its case, the second more about the shape of the field.

    Evidence for the claim as stated.

Open questions

Tensions this paper is part of

From concept pages' “where studies disagree.” Disagreement means the same question; scope means different assays, populations, or outcomes.

Related papers in this topic

Same topic cluster — not a recommendation engine.